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A New Image in the Looking Glass:
Faculty Mentoring, Invitational Rhetoric, and the
Second-Class Status of Women in U.S. Academia
Carlo A. Pedrioli*
"A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now, here, you see, it
takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you
want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as
that!"'
I. INTRODUCTION
When Lani Guinier attended law school during the 1970s, her professor
for Business Units 1 would greet his class every morning by stating,
"'Good morning, gentlemen,"' despite the fact that the class included
women.2 Although Guinier's professor acknowledged that he had taught
for many years and his greeting was a function of habit, Guinier, sitting "in
a room adorned by the traditional larger-than-life portraits of white men,"
interpreted this act of her professor as a sign that becoming a professional
meant losing one's gender, or at least one's female gender.3  This
* B.A. (Summa Cum Laude), Communication and English, California State University,
Stanislaus, 1999; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A., Communication, University of
Utah, 2003. Member, State Bar of California. Currently, the author is pursuing a Ph.D. in
Communication at the University of Utah. For thoughts on and responses to previous
versions of this article, the author gratefully acknowledges Ruth Jones of the University of
the Pacific; Chad Pedrioli, formerly of the University of California, Berkeley; Julie Kalil
Schutten of the University of Utah; and Kerith M. Woodyard of the University of Utah. The
author plans to present a version of this article as part of a Communication and Law
Division panel at the 9 0 'h annual meeting of the National Communication Association,
which will take place in Chicago, Illinois, in November 2004.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, quoted in JOAN ABRAMSON, THE
INVISIBLE WOMAN: DISCRIMINATION IN THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION v (1975).
2. LANI GUINIER, ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 85 (1997).
3. Id. Guinier also notes how her professor utilized discourse which suggested that
becoming a professional involved becoming free of race. Id.
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interpretation did not suggest that lawyers could be female.
Ten years later, on the thirtieth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education,4 Guinier returned
to her law school alma mater to speak and ended up speaking in the same
classroom in which she and her former classmates had met for Business
Units 1. Beneath the larger-than-life portraits, many of her fellow alums
spoke fondly about returning "'home' to their law school and shared "self-
congratulatory" anecdotes.' When Guinier spoke, she had no fond
memories from her law school experience to share; rather, she had only
memories of an experience filled with "alienation and isolation" through
which she "slowly disappear[ed] each morning and be[came] one of the
gentlemen."6 Nonetheless, Guinier did her best to remain "upright and
dignified" while making her remarks.'
In the 1990s, Guinier, then a law professor who taught in the same
room where her Business Units 1 class had met, felt that when she taught
law she was still "surrounded by the surreal shadow of those brooding
gentlemen. 8 Apparently, newcomers had not joined the gentlemen on the
walls, so the law school's past continued to haunt the law school's present. 9
Even as a professor, Guinier remained an outsider to legal academia.
Guinier's outsider narrative from her time as a law student to her time
as a law professor helps to illustrate the climate that many women -
particularly in fields like law that society traditionally has gendered
"masculine" - have experienced upon attempting to enter U.S. academia.
Notwithstanding legal efforts to assist women in integrating into the
academia, women as a group have had a relatively difficult time making
that integration. Although since the early 1970s Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, as amended,' ° has attempted to help open the doors of
academia to women who seek positions as scholars and teachers in higher
education, those doors have not come close to opening fully. Gender-based
employment discrimination, unintentional or otherwise, still persists in
academia, especially at some research institutions." The problem
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court held that racially segregated
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
stated that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
5. GUINIER, ETAL., supra note 2, at 86.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 89.
9. In her narrative, Guinier makes no mention of any women whose portraits the law
school eventually had hung among those of the "brooding gentlemen."
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1972 & West Supp. 2004). Title VII prohibits public and
private employers from discriminating based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
11. Martha S. West, Faculty Women's Struggle for Equality at the University of
California Davis, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 259, 260-61 (2000).
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manifests itself when qualified women do not receive offers for academic
positions, promotion, or tenure. 12 In addition to the harm to the women
who seek fulfilling academic careers, harm occurs when academia denies
students many of the ideas and viewpoints of female academics, ideas and
viewpoints which both men and women likely will encounter in the
workforce and in life.
13
Accordingly, this article maintains that because Title VII alone does
not have the ability to further the progress women have made in academic
hiring, retention, and promotion, looking to remedies in addition to Title
VII will be advantageous in helping to improve the status of women in U.S.
academia. The article suggests as an additional remedy the implementation
of faculty mentoring opportunities for junior female faculty members. A
key way of initiating and furthering such mentoring opportunities is a type
of discourse called invitational rhetoric, which is "an invitation to
understanding as a means to create... relationship[s] rooted in equality,
immanent value, and self-determination."
' 14
In presenting a case for such an approach, 15 this article initially will
identify the current problem by comparing women's presence and their
salaries in U.S. academia in the early 1970s with their presence and salaries
in academia today. Next, the article will evaluate the types of Title VII
cases that the law allows plaintiffs to bring. In doing so, the article will
highlight the heavy burden of showing discriminatory intent and also will
critique previous suggestions for modifying Title VII. Finally, this article
will justify faculty mentoring opportunities and invitational rhetoric as an
additional approach to addressing the present status of women in U.S.
academia.
12. West supra note 11, at 260-61.
13. Ellen R. Dassance, Note, Affirmative Action Implications for Colleges and
Universities Beyond the Scholarship and Student Admissions Areas, 5 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 661, 676 (1997).
14. Sonja K. Foss & Cindy L. Griffin, Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational
Rhetoric, 62 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 2, 5 (1995). Foss and Griffin's work comes from
contemporary feminist rhetorical theory. A much more detailed discussion of invitational
rhetoric follows in section IV.B.2 of this article.
To this point in time, legal scholars have not considered the concept of invitational
rhetoric as an alternative to traditional legal rhetoric. A search of the law reviews listed on
LexisNexis and published since 1995, the year in which Foss and Griffin published their
article that introduced the concept, failed to locate any instances of the term invitational
rhetoric.
15. As the discussion later on in this article will imply, a tension exists between the
nature of invitational rhetoric itself and ultimately making an argument for the
implementation of invitational rhetoric. In short, invitational rhetoric is suggestive, not
argumentative, in nature. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 5-7.
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II. THE PROBLEM
A. WOMEN'S PRESENCE IN ACADEMIA- THE EARLY 1970s VERSUS
TODAY
In 1972, when Congress applied Title VII to educational institutions,
16
women as a group held a small percentage of the advanced degrees
necessary to obtain university teaching positions. The percentage of
women in the pool of individuals with newly-issued doctorates illustrates
this point. 17 In 1971, women earned 14.3% of the research doctorates that
U.S. universities granted.' 8 With regard to professional doctorates, women
in 1970 earned 5.4% of the law degrees and 8.4% of the medical degrees
awarded. 19 As these numbers illustrate, men were earning the vast majority
of doctorates granted in the United States in the early 1970s.
During this period of time, women composed only 23.1% of academia
in general. 20 Given the low percentages of doctorates that women earned in
the 1970s, the 23.1% figure suggests that many of the women who taught
in higher education held master's degrees rather than doctoral degrees and
thus held lower positions than many of the male faculty members. In
accredited law schools in 1970, the percentage of women was even smaller
than the percentage of women in academia overall, as women made up a
mere 4% of law professors.2'
Since the early 1970s, the numbers of women who have earned
research and professional doctorates have improved notably. Today,
women earn 44.9% of the research doctoral degrees granted in the U.S.22
In terms of professional doctoral degrees, women earn 47.3% of the law
23degrees and 43.3% of the medical degrees granted.
As one would expect from these data, the position of women in
academia has improved somewhat since the early 1970s. Women now hold
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972 & West Supp. 2004).
17. Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect
Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 67, 74 (1994). For purposes of this article, the term
doctorate refers to research doctorates such as the Ph.D. as well as to professional
doctorates such as the J.D. and the M.D.
18. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 193
(2003).
19. Id. at 194.
20. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 1999 DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 201 (Thomas J. Snyder & Charlene M. Hoffman eds., 2000).
21. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An
Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 199
(1991).
22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 18, at 193 (relying upon figures for 2001). See also
Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract Positions and
the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 13 (2000).
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 18, at 194 (relying upon figures for 2001). See also
Angel, supra note 22, at 13 (noting the data on law degrees but not on medical degrees).
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33.1% of the tenure-track university teaching positions in the U.S.
2 4
Moreover, when the figures include instructors and lecturers, women
constitute 35.6% of all university teachers.25 In accredited law schools
26today, 31.4% of full-time professors are female. These data suggest a
slightly upgraded presence for women in academia since the early 1970s.
Regardless, women still hold academic positions in lower percentages
than they hold professional and research doctorates. As noted above,
women earn well over 40% of the doctorates awarded in the U.S. today, yet
women hold only approximately one-third of the tenure-track positions in
U.S. higher education. The research for this article provided no evidence to
suggest that women who earn doctorates are less inclined to enter academia
than men who earn the same degrees. Particularly in the humanities, where
doctorates often do not lead to employment outside of academia, it would
seem unusual for women to work extremely hard to earn advanced degrees
and then not rely upon those degrees in the course of career development.
With regard to other disciplines like law and medicine that have obvious
pragmatic applications it would be curious to think that women would flee
discrimination in academia and expect to escape from such discrimination
by gaining employment in courtrooms and operating rooms, environments
which society traditionally has gendered "masculine." Although improved
from the early 1970s, the disproportionately low presence of women in
academia remains notable.
Additionally, not all academic positions are equal, and women suffer
from this point. The tenure-track positions are assistant professorships,
which help faculty members move up to associate professorships and
ultimately to full professorships. Non-tenure-track positions like
lectureships and instructorships often lack job security.27 Today, women
still lag behind men in tenure-track positions and tenure held. For instance,
77.3% of women in academia hold tenure-track positions, compared to
88.3% of men.28 At the same time, 48.2% of women have achieved tenure,
29while 68.2% of men have achieved tenure. In law schools, women hold
24. The Annual Report on the Economic Status of the Profession, 87
ACADEME: BULL. OF THE AM. Ass'N OF U. PROFESSORS, at Table 12 (2001) [hereinafter
Annual Report] (relying upon figures for the 2000-2001 academic year), available at
http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/index.htm (last visited April 7, 2004).
The 33.1% figure comes from a division of the percent of tenure-track women (29.6% of the
total population of teachers in higher education) by the sum of the percent of tenure-track
men (59.7% of the total population of teachers in higher education) and the percent of
tenure-track women. This computation was necessary because the data provided in Annual
Report included instructors and lecturers, who are often not in tenure-track positions.
25. Id.
26. ABA.LSAC, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS - 2004 EDITION
824 (Wendy Margolis, et al. eds., 2003).
27. West, supra note 17, at 78.
28. Annual Report, supra note 24, at Table 11.
29. Id.
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70% of the positions in teaching legal writing, which tends to be one of the
lower-status faculty jobs in legal academia.3° In the same field, women
hold 65.3% of the librarian positions, which legal academia also grants
lower standing.3 1 Despite their minority status as law librarians, men hold
46% of the teaching librarian positions, which legal academia has deemed
more prestigious than the non-teaching librarian positions.32
B. WOMEN'S SALARIES iN ACADEMIA- THE EARLY 1970s VERSUS
TODAY
Not only have women faced obstacles in gaining access to faculty
positions in academia, but women who succeed in entering academia have
earned less money than men for performing the same academic duties. For
example, during the 1972-1973 academic year, at the full-professor level
men earned $19,414, while women earned $17,123. 33 At the associate
professor level men made $14,723, and women made $13,827. 34 Finally, at
the assistant-professor level men averaged $12,193 per year, while women
averaged $11,510.
3 5
Since the early 1970s, women have made virtually no progress in
achieving equal salaries. The average male to female salary ratio for full
professors today is $80,860 to $71,419. 36 The average male to female
salary ratio for associate professors is $58,941 to $54,638.37 The problem
most clearly becomes apparent with the average male to female salary ratio
for assistant professors, which is $49,015 to $45,437.38 Assistant
professors are all relatively new to their jobs and with similar experience
assumedly deserve to receive approximately the same amount of money,
yet a $3,500-plus discrepancy in annual salaries remains.
These statistics point out that the number of pennies women make for
each dollar men make has not increased in any material way since the early
1970s. 39 For instance, in the early 1970s, a female full professor earned 88
cents for each dollar a male full professor earned; today, she earns 88 cents
30. Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal
Writing, 50 J.LEGAL EDUC. 562, 565, 570 (2000).
31. Angel, supra note 22, at 2.
32. Id. at 2-3.
33. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 276.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Annual Report, supra note 24, at Table 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The numbers in this paragraph resulted from a comparison of the female-male ratio of
annual pay from the early 1970s and the female-male ratio of annual pay from today. For
example, in the early 1970s, the female-male ratio for full professors was $17,123 to
$19,414, or approximately .88. Today, the female-male ratio for full professors is $71,419
to $80,860, or approximately 88. For all of the original numbers, see NATIONAL CENTER
FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 276 and Annual Report, supra note 24, at
Table 5.
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for each dollar. In the early 1970s, a female associate professor earned 94
cents for each dollar a male associate professor earned; today, she earns 93
cents for each dollar. Finally, in the early 1970s, a female assistant
professor earned 94 cents for each dollar a male assistant professor earned;
today, she earns 93 cents for each dollar. A reasonable person would
expect that by now the percent of men's pay that women of the same
educational level earn would have increased in a notable manner.
Unfortunately, this is not the result. As suggested above, particularly
disturbing is the fact that women at the assistant professor level still make
less money than men at the same level.
One possible explanation for the inequity in pay that women receive
for doing the same academic jobs that men do is that many women, unlike
many men, tend not to engage in salary negotiations.40 Socialized in the
U.S. not to ask for what they want, many women end up not negotiating
their salaries while seeking employment. 41 The results of such behavior
can have an important impact on women's starting salaries, which then
42impact earnings over time. If this diagnosis is accurate, one obvious
potential remedy would be for women to practice their negotiation skills. 43
While such an approach might be helpful, this approach is akin to passing
tough laws against rape and battery.44 Although tough legislation can help
to protect women from rape and battery, such legislation does not address
the underlying social causes of these violent crimes. 4' Likewise, in an
institution that pays men higher starting salaries than it pays women to do
the same jobs, a deeper problem than equitable pay remains; the institution
has a mind-set that tolerates gender-based discrimination. Rather than only
encouraging women to think in terms of negotiation, it is also important to
focus on bringing to the surface the deeper discriminatory ideology that
treats women inequitably.
46
In summary of the problem, women have come closer to earning a
proportionate share of the advanced degrees necessary for entry into
academia. However, women still lag behind men both in the percentages
of academic positions held and in the salaries for those positions.
40. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE 1-4 (2003).
41. Id. at 62-65.
42. Id. at 4-7.
43. Mentors of new female employees might encourage new female employees to think
of employment terms as negotiable. Id. at 36.
44. KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 194 (1984) (citing
the work of Catherine MacKinnon).
45. Id. Ferguson sees "the violence-laden imagery of masculinity and heterosexuality
prevalent in our culture" as an underlying social condition that finds expression in the rape
of women. Id.
46. See infra section IV.B.3 (suggesting invitational rhetoric is one approach that can
help to bring underlying assumptions to the surface).
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III. THE LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS
A. TITLE VII GENERALLY
Thus, in 1972 the law has attempted to help increase women's access
to faculty positions and advancement in academia. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in public and private




Originally, educational institutions held an exemption from Title VII, but in
1972 Congress brought such institutions within the reach of Title VII.
48
Thus, in 1972, federal law prohibited universities from discriminating
against women in hiring, retention, and promotion. However, although
Title VII has attempted to provide for equality of opportunity in university
faculty employment, in many cases that opportunity may exist on paper
only. Title VII also has not succeeded in bringing about equality of result
in university faculty employment.49
The shortcoming of Title VII in achieving equitable results may be a
function of the difficulty of proving Title VII claims. Schneider v.
Northwestern University5° exemplifies the problem of proving gender
discrimination in academic employment. In Schneider, Northwestern
University denied tenure to Assistant Professor Barbara Schneider.
Schneider successfully established a prima facie case for discrimination by
showing that (1) she was female, (2) she was qualified for tenure because
she had two reviews for tenure, (3) the defendant denied her tenure, and (4)
one or two men on the faculty had received tenure at about the same time
that she was denied tenure.5' By maintaining that Schneider's scholarship
was of insufficient quality, Northwestern University succeeded in offering
a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the tenure.52
The court next turned to the issue of discriminatory intent. Evidence
showed that a male faculty member had once grabbed Schneider's breast,
53
while on two occasions a senior male faculty member had called Schneider
"the Dean's Girl Friday."54 Another senior male faculty member twice had
told Schneider to "just go home and have babies." 55 Yet another senior
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As of this writing, sexual orientation does not receive
protection under Title VII. Some further limitations apply to Title VII protection. For
instance, an employer must have at least fifteen employees for Title VII to apply to that
employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b). Also, Title VII does not cover religious educational
institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
49. For more on the concepts of equality of opportunity and equality of result, see
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 136 (2000).
50. 925 F. Supp. 1347 (1996).
51. Id. at 1368.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1369.
54. Id. at 1370.
55. Id.
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male faculty member frequently made sexually suggestive remarks to
faculty members and graduate students and touched female graduate
students at Friday afternoon parties.56 This evidence suggested a sexually
hostile environment for women, including the plaintiff, but Schneider was
unable to prove that during the tenure process this climate gave rise to an
intent to discriminate against her based on her gender.57 As the discussion
below will point out, proving intent is one major problem in cases of
discrimination in academic hiring, retention, and promotion.
B. THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL
In gender discrimination cases, plaintiffs can bring two types of suits:
58disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. The disparate impact
model is poorly suited for cases that involve academic hiring, retention, and
promotion. In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff must show that specific
employment criteria have a disproportionately negative effect on a
protected group such as women.59 With regard to the case of academic
hiring where a group of women may suffer discrimination, the criteria for
the job are somewhat fluid. The mix of general criteria might include the
candidate's teaching ability, intelligence, imagination, and scholarship.6 °
How these and other criteria weigh against each other frequently is hard to
determine, as different members of a hiring committee demonstrate by
disagreeing about whether to hire a given candidate.61 With regard to the
case of academic retention or promotion, whether to give tenure or a
promotion to a female professor revolves around one candidate, not a group
62
of candidates. Hence, the structural requirements of the disparate impact
model are inappropriate for the context of academic hiring, retention, and
promotion.
C. THE DISPARATE TREATMENT MODEL
In contrast to the disparate impact model, the disparate treatment model
56. BELL, supra note 49, at 1370.
57. Id.
58. Frank M. Baglione, Note, Title VII and the Tenure Decision: The Need for a
Qualified Academic Freedom Privilege Protecting Confidential Peer Review Materials in
University Employment Discrimination Cases, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 691, 696-97 (1987).
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Griggs, black plaintiffs
challenged the defendant's requirement of a high school diploma or passing an intelligence
test as a prerequisite to work at the defendant's generating plant. Defendant did not rely
upon either of these requirements to evaluate employees' abilities to work in particular jobs.
Hence, the requirements were not "related to job performance" and ultimately violated Title
VII. Id. at 431-32.
60. David Y. Loh, Note, A Critical Analysis of Academic Tenure Decisions: The
Disparate Treatment Model Under Title VIIExamined, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 399
(1992) (here discussing the above listed criteria and others in the context of tenure). Many
of the factors relied upon in hiring decisions would apply in tenure decisions and vice versa.
61. Id (again discussing this matter in the context of tenure).
62. Id. at 398-99.
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more appropriately fits cases of discrimination in academic hiring,
retention, and promotion, although this model has its limitations, too.
Under the disparate treatment model, a member of a protected group
ultimately needs to show intentional discrimination, 63 but before the
plaintiff does so, the case must pass through two stages. First, the plaintiff
has to make a prima facie case by demonstrating the following: (1) that she
is a member of a protected group, (2) that, being qualified, she applied for a
job with the defendant, (3) that the defendant rejected her application, and
(4) that after rejecting the woman's application, the defendant continued to
seek applicants for the position.64 Second, after the plaintiff makes her
prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of production to articulate
"some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the woman's
application. 65 Third, if the defendant succeeds, the plaintiff then must show
that the defendant's proffered reason is only a pretext for discrimination.66
In order to win, the plaintiff still has to prove that the defendant
discriminated intentionally; discrediting the defendant's proffered reason
for discrimination is not enough.67 Although the burden of production
shifts throughout the case, at all times the plaintiff retains the burden of
68persuasion.
Because of what the disparate treatment model does not require
plaintiffs to prove, this model is more appropriate for cases of faculty
hiring, retention, and promotion decisions than the disparate impact model.
63. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). In St. Mary's Honor
Center, a black man sued his employer, claiming that his employer fired him because of the
plaintiffs race. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Title VII plaintiff always bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion, despite a presumption that may arise in favor of the plaintiff
upon the plaintiffs making a prima facie case for discrimination. To overcome this
presumption, the defendant only has to meet a burden of production. Id. at 510-11. A
presumption shifts the burden of production in a case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (7th
ed. 1999). For definitions of the terms burden of production and burden of persuasion, see
infra note 65.
64. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff, a black civil rights activist, alleged racial discrimination by defendant
employer in the re-hiring process of plaintiff as mechanic for defendant.
65. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 510-11. Burden of production refers to a
"party's duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-
finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling such as a summary
judgment or a directed verdict." This term is also known as burden of going forward with
evidence or burden of producing evidence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 63, at
190. In contrast, burden ofpersuasion refers to a "party's duty to convince the fact-finder to
view the facts in a way that favors the party." This term is sometimes also known as burden
ofproof Id.
66. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
67. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511.
68. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1981). In this
case, a female state employee sued her employer on a theory of gender-based discrimination
during the employee's employment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 63, at 190
(discussing the terms burden of production and burden of persuasion) and supra text
accompanying note 65.
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For instance, specific faculty positions require extremely specialized skills,
small numbers of qualified people are available for the positions, 69 and the
small pool of applicants would make it harder to show discrimination
against a whole group of applicants. Also, the criteria for selection are
highly subjective, and proving that large numbers of women have suffered
discrimination based on the same criteria would be difficult.70 In the same
vein, a variety of reasons might explain why an employer did not hire a
female candidate. 71 However, one major limitation of the disparate
treatment model is the requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory
intent.
D. THE BURDEN OF PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN DISPARATE
TREATMENT CASES
Under the disparate treatment approach to Title VII suits based on
academic hiring, retention, and promotion decisions, a plaintiff must meet
the heavy burden of persuasion of proving discriminatory intent. Schneider
v. Northwestern University,72  detailed above, demonstrates how
problematic this task can be. Because defendants usually do not casually
leave direct evidence of discriminatory intent for a plaintiff to find, the
plaintiff must work to show intent via indirect evidence.73 In Schneider's
situation, apparently generous evidence of a sexually hostile work
environment was insufficient to show discriminatory intent.
The plaintiff in a tenure case, unlike the plaintiff in a hiring case, is
fortunate enough to have the right of access to peer-review materials
generated during the tenure review process. The plaintiff does not have to
show a specific need for access,74 as the university does not have a special
75privilege for materials generated during the decision-making process.
Normal discovery for which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
is enough for the plaintiff to obtain the materials.76 Nonetheless, the
supposedly well-educated faculty members who sit on tenure committees
77are not likely to write liability-inducing comments on their reviews.
Thus, although the plaintiff in a tenure case may have access to the review
69. Loh, supra note 60, at 400 (discussing these ideas in the context of tenure only)
(citing George R. Kramer, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University Employment,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1206, 1210 (1982)).
70. Id. at 401.
71. Id.
72. Schneider v. Northwestern University, 925 F. Supp. 1347 (1996).
73. Loh, supra note 60, at 401.
74. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990). In this case, the
plaintiff sued her employer, a university which refused to grant her tenure, on a theory of
discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin.
75. Id. at 189.
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
77. William A. Kohlbum, Note, The Double-Edged Sword of Academic Freedom:
Cutting the Scales of Justice in Title Vl Litigation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 445, 457 (1987).
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materials, she is unlikely to find any hard evidence of discrimination. The
plaintiff in a hiring case, without access to hiring materials, is at an even
greater disadvantage.
E. A CRITIQUE OF THE REMEDIES THAT ADDRESS THE DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT REQUIREMENT
Commentators have proposed various solutions to help female
plaintiffs meet the burden of proving intent, but such solutions often urge a
problematic shift in the burden of proof.78  For instance, one approach
suggests that after the plaintiff has made her prima facie case and the
defendant has articulated some apparently legitimate reason for
discrimination, the plaintiff has to show that discrimination stands in equal
probability with the defendant's proffered reason for discrimination. Then
the burden of persuading the court that the decision was nondiscriminatory
shifts to the defendant.
79
The difficulty with the equal-probability suggestion is that the plaintiff
still has to show intent to discriminate, only the standard of proof is at 50 %
instead of just over 50%. Because this proposed change in the standard of
proof is so slight and the requirement of intent is still ominously present,
the equal-probability approach would do little to remedy the continuing
problems that women face in entering and advancing in academia.
Additionally, two more approaches propose burden-shifting. One of
these approaches suggests shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant right after the plaintiff has made her prima facie case. 80  A
similar approach calls for the defendant to prove rather than articulate why
its decision was legitimate.81
The problem with shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant is
that the defendant may not be in a position to articulate why it failed to hire
the plaintiff. As noted above, the criteria for academic hiring are highly
82subjective, and members of the defendant's hiring committee may not be
able to explain exactly why those members failed to hire the female
candidate. For instance, if the hiring committee is mostly male, its
members may simply develop a better chemistry with a male applicant.
The committee members may not even be consciously aware why they are
83more comfortable interacting with another man.
78. Karen W. Kramer, Note, Overcoming Higher Hurdles: Shifting the Burden of Proof
After Hicks and Ezold, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 404, 434-35 (1995).
79. Kohlbum, supra note 77, at 468. Kohlbum's article also suggests standards of proof
for obtaining evidence through discovery that are no longer relevant after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. See University of Pennsylvania,
493 U.S. at 195.
80. Deborah E. Moore, Note, Disparate Treatment Versus Disparate Impact: A
Distinction Without a Difference, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 965 (1990).
81. Kramer, supra note 78, at 443 n.228.
82. Loh, supra note 60, at 400.
83. Another possibility is that unconscious discrimination is present; the faculty members
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If the members of the hiring committee get beyond chemistry and
consider the merits of scholarship, the problem of a high degree of
subjectivity still remains. The following hypothetical in which Congress
passes a statute in favor of corporate U.S.A. illustrates this point. The male
applicant, a law and economics scholar, extols the virtues of efficiency in
the market that will come with this new law, while the female applicant, a
feminist scholar, critiques the law as harmful to women's advancement in
business. How one determines the relative importance of the law and
economics critique versus the feminist critique is a question on which no
large group of scholars would agree. This matter is highly subjective.84
Beyond chemistry and types of scholarship, a hiring committee may
look to professional experience. In the above hypothetical, the law and
economics scholar has two years of experience teaching economics
graduate students at Prestigious University, while the feminist scholar has
two years of experience clerking for a federal appellate judge in the
Prestigious Circuit. Both scholars have two years of impressive work
experience, yet again the employer would have to explain why it chose the
male applicant over the female applicant. A correct decision probably does
not exist, but an employer still has to make a decision.
The above examples pertain to the hiring process, but similar problems
arise in the retention and promotion process. For instance, chemistry may
not develop among faculty members in a department the way it could have
developed. Moreover, the tenure committee could feel that the plaintiffs
teaching methods are inappropriate at the university where the plaintiff
seeks tenure. Likewise, the committee might not accept the value of the
professor's research, regardless of how carefully and responsibly the
professor conducted the research. While it is no doubt disappointing for a
may not even know that they are discriminating against women. See Charles R. Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322-23 (1987). As the title of Lawrence's work suggests, Lawrence's article
focuses on racism rather than on gender-based discrimination. However, given that
outsiders from any group may be at risk for suffering discrimination, whether based on race,
gender, or otherwise, a similar analysis applies with regard to gender as it does with regard
to race.
84. Some scholars have argued that such evaluation of scholarship takes place within a
"male paradigm" and thus relies upon a masculine "yardstick" to evaluate all scholarship.
See, e.g., Carole Blair, Julie R. Brown, & Leslie A. Baxter, Disciplining the Feminine, 80 Q.
J. SPEECH 383, 389-95 (1994). Hence, the gatekeepers to academia, traditionally older white
men, call upon their own standards to evaluate all scholarship, whether men or women are
responsible for that scholarship. Id. In their article, Blair, Brown, and Baxter critique
academia's response to their own critique of a study that attempted to evaluate the scholarly
work of female academics in the field of communication. Blair, Brown, and Baxter point
out that in the study in question the scholars who evaluated the female academics made
frequent reference to the term prolific, which metaphorically linked the "successful"
performances of the female academics to the production levels of the female academics'
bodies. Id. at 395. According to Blair, Brown, and Baxter, this type of male monitoring of
female scholarship allows men to maintain control over women in academia. Id.
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hard-working, upcoming scholar to be denied tenure, subconscious
perceptions of chemistry and decisions regarding teaching ability and
research are about as precise as critiquing visual art; personal taste plays a
major role in the decision-making process. Just as requiring that the
plaintiff prove discriminatory intent is taxing on the plaintiff, requiring that
the employer articulate and explain, in a detailed manner that an outside
third-party such as a judge could accept, how the employer's agents came
to their decision, likewise would be taxing on the defendant.
If the law did not require proof of intent to discriminate, a plaintiff
would have a somewhat easier time making her case, but this approach is
problematic since it still would require the plaintiff to prove her
qualifications, including the relative value of her scholarship. As noted
above, this would not necessarily be easy to demonstrate. Thus, removing
the intent requirement would leave a significant obstacle for the plaintiff to
clear and since burden shifting, the major suggestion in the scholarly
literature for modifying Title VII disparate treatment claims, would either
help the plaintiff in an immeasurably small way or put a potentially
arduous burden on the defendant. Therefore Title VII alone, as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court, is not the sole answer to the continuing
problem that many women face in academic hiring, retention, and
promotion. This situation now calls for additional approaches.
IV. AN ADDITIONAL APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
DISCRIMINATION IN ACADEMIA
Despite some improvements in the status of women in academia since
the early 1970s, the above analysis suggests that Title VII by itself does not
have the ability to improve materially the status of women in academia
today. To help address this shortcoming in the law and hence
discrimination in academia, this article proposes looking to another option
in addition to Title VII, specifically the implementation of faculty
mentoring - which invitational rhetoric can help to create and develop.
This proposal is by no means the only approach to employing additional
options besides Title VII. Rather, this proposal is one potential method of
moving in a positive direction. The next two subsections of this article will
address faculty mentoring and invitational rhetoric in turn.
A. FACULTY MENTORING
Junior female faculty members and other outsiders can benefit from
authorities within academia whom the academic power structure perceives
as credible and who are willing to take junior outsider faculty members
seriously.85 Accordingly, the discussion now turns to faculty mentoring
85. Annalise E. Acorn, Discrimination in Academia and the Cultural Production of
Intellectual Cachet, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 359, 361 (2000) (suggesting that positive
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and its application in academia.
1. The Importance of Mentoring Opportunities
Mentoring is "an intimate relationship between a junior person and a
senior person" and "involves active participation in another's career.,
86
Such mentoring helps the mentored individual meet high expectations,87
and through the process of mentoring, the mentored individual gains access
to opportunities on the job.88  While mentoring is often a one-on-one
process, co-mentoring is a closely related possibility and may be more
appealing to some women than one-on-one mentoring.89
In a pragmatic way, mentoring can be one means of helping members
of outsider groups advance in the workplace since insiders can assist
outsiders in making helpful new connections.9" For instance, mentoring
can provide newer female and minority employees with exposure to higher-
ups.91 Further, mentoring can allow junior employees, especially members
of outsider groups, access to defense against negative feedback in the
workplace.92 In short, mentoring grants outsiders access to some of the
power that insiders have long held.93 To underscore this point, many black
women have reported that having mentors was important to professional
94
success and that not having mentors was a barrier to professional success.
Previous scholarship suggests that mentoring works more effectively if
the mentor voluntarily chooses the person she wishes to mentor" - one
could assume that the converse is also accurate. Given that some insiders
may not feel comfortable mentoring members of outside groups and that
some outsiders may not feel comfortable with insider mentors,96 mentoring
interactions with senior faculty members will help new female faculty members gain
confidence in their own minds).
86. Pamela J. Smith, Failing to Mentor Sapphire: The Actionability of Blocking Black
Women from Initiating Mentoring Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 373, 381 (2000).
87. GUINIER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 95 (addressing mentoring in the faculty-student
context as a way to help female and minority students achieve success at law school).
88. Smith, supra note 86, at 385. Smith notes that insider mentors can help members of
outsider groups prove discrimination in violation of Title VII. While this claim may be
accurate, given the above analysis in this article, outsiders, even those with some insider
help, may not want to count exclusively on the courts. Hence, the suggested approach of
this article becomes important.
89. Id. at 384.
90. Id. at 385. Smith speaks of black women, but her point applies to members of any
outsider group, whether women or racial minorities, since members of all outsider groups
are at potential risk for experiencing discrimination from the establishment.
91. GUINIER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 89-97 (focusing on the law school context). Smith,
supra note 86, at 386 (focusing on the workplace).
92. Smith, supra note 86, at 385.
93. Id. at 389-90. In this regard, senior white male mentors can be of great help since
they can help to bridge the gap between outsiders and insiders. Id. at 466.
94. Id. at 391.
95. Id. at 382-83.
96. Id. at 403. Smith notes that many black women in academia have experienced
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in this situation might seem problematic. The issue of the potential lack of
comfort in the mentoring context will receive consideration shortly.
Although mentoring may work better if the relationship is purely
voluntarily, organizations can create more formal mentoring programs.
97
Organizations which create formal mentoring situations tend to benefit
from endeavoring to mirror informal mentoring relationships as closely as
possible. Thus, providing access to mentors is helpful, but requiring that
two given individuals engage in a mentoring relationship can be
problematic.98
Mentoring can play an important role in the practice of law. For
example, mentoring can help young lawyers make the transition from law
students to experienced lawyers. 99 More specifically, mentoring can give
young lawyers the opportunity to learn about aspects of legal practice such
as particular hearings or depositions. 100 Also, opportunities for mentoring
can help young practitioners feel more fulfilled in and committed to their
work, and this feeling can lead to better workplace relationships.1'
Thurgood Marshall himself credited much of his success as a lawyer, and
in turn much of the success of the civil rights movement, to Charles
Houston, Marshall's mentor.10 2 While mentoring can benefit the young and
less experienced, it also can benefit mentors themselves, who are likewise
,,103involved in this "worthwhile relationship. Although mentors may have
more experience overall, the people they mentor can have experiences to
share, too.
In light of the value of mentoring in the practice of law, legal
practitioners have taken steps to further mentoring opportunities. For
example, senior practitioners have offered the profession an understanding
of how mentoring can work'0 4 and implemented bar mentoring programs. 05
The value of mentoring even has led to a call for reassessment of senior
partners' commitment to billable hours so that senior partners can have
discomfort with transracial interactions with other members of their universities.
97. Smith, supra note 86, at 383.
98. Id. at 383.
99. Tod Aronovitz, Mentoring is for You!, FLA. B.J., May 2003, at 4, 5.
100. David R. Fine, Guiding Hand, Helping Hand, PA. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 16, 18.
101. Susan G. Manch, Building Loyalty: The Relationship Between Mentoring and
Retention, OR. ST. B. BULL., Apr. 2000, at 21, 25.
102. Id.
103. John P. Knox, Role Models: Senior Lawyers As Mentors for Young Lawyers, PA.
LAW., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 36, 39.
104. See, e.g., Grenn S. Bacal, Secrets of a Mentor: How Young Lawyers Can
Purposefully Evolve Into Good and Happy Lawyers, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Nov. 1999, at 38, 38 and
Ida 0. Abbott, Mentors Are Yours for the Asking, SAN FRANCISCO ATr'Y, Jun.-July 2000, at
25, 25.
105. See, e.g., Stuart Forsyth, It's Better to Give and to Receive: Join Out Mentor
Program, ARIz. Ar'y, Aug.-Sept. 1999, at 8, 8 and Lawyer to Lawyer Program Provides
Mentor Network, 61 OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2001, at 62, 62.
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more time to mentor associates.10 6 Additionally, lawyers have reached out
to mentor racial minority law students in an effort to assist those students in
becoming successful members of the profession. 107
2. Mentoring Opportunities in Academia
Given this understanding of mentoring and the implementation of
mentoring in legal practice, U.S. universities and colleges would benefit
from providing junior faculty members, especially women and other
outsiders, with access to both senior male and senior female faculty
members.10 8  However, universities would not do well to force junior
faculty members to engage in mentoring relationships with senior faculty
members. To make potential mentoring opportunities available, a
department or college of a university could place junior faculty members
on committees with senior faculty members. 109  Thus, junior faculty
members would have access to senior members of the faculty. If mentoring
relationships develop, junior faculty members would have ingress to
additional opportunities on the job, including the chance to meet well-
connected individuals.
One potential problem with faculty mentoring, as pointed out above, is
that some members of the insider group in academia, notably older white
men, may be uncomfortable with mentoring members of outsider groups
like women, and some members of outsider groups may be uncomfortable
with insiders as mentors. To an extent, the discomfort of many insiders
may be due to ignorance of outsider groups and their struggles, while the
discomfort of many outsiders may be due to historical marginalization.
Unfortunately, in some cases the ignorance of some insiders may have bred
hostility towards outsiders. As Charles Lawrence has observed,
discrimination can be unconscious, so in some situations the discriminating
parties may not even be aware of engaging in discriminatory behavior." 0
Given that some potential mentoring relationships might prove
uncomfortable, it would be wise for outsiders to seek a variety of mentors
over time. For instance, a younger female faculty member may enter a
mentoring relationship with an older female faculty member who could
address some of the experiences, including gender-based discrimination,
that a senior female faculty member would be well able to address.
Additionally, at some point in the future if she feels comfortable doing so,
106. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Mentoring As Duty and Privilege, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2003, at 46,
46.
107. See, e.g., Minority Mentor Program, RI. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 17, 17.
108. To make this approach more viable, accreditation entities could encourage
universities and colleges to make mentoring opportunities available to all junior faculty
members, including women. For instance, in law the American Bar Association would be
the entity that could provide such encouragement.
109. Smith, supra note 86, at 383.
110. Lawrence, supra note 83, at 322-23.
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the younger female faculty member may choose to enter a mentoring
relationship with a willing and able senior male faculty member who, while
perhaps unable to address issues of gender-based discrimination, could
address his personal track to tenure in academia. This insight might be
particularly helpful for a novice academic. Hence, if at first the novice
academic is uncomfortable with an older male as a mentor, she could begin
with an older female as a mentor and diversify her mentoring experiences
over time. Just as being a student entails learning from a variety of
teachers, so being a novice academic can entail learning from a variety of
experienced academics, even if the process begins in a somewhat limited
way.
With regard to facilitating mentoring, institutions would do well to take
a balanced approach. Obviously, it is unfair to expect only senior female
faculty members to mentor newer faculty women. Hence, while such
senior female faculty members ideally would play a key role in faculty
mentoring, hopefully they would not be the only faculty members involved
in mentoring. Naturally, so senior female faculty members do not have to
do all of the mentoring, allowing willing and open-minded senior male
faculty members to participate is important to the success of faculty
mentoring. If academia presumes that senior white males are unable to
mentor members of outsider groups, senior white males easily could feel
excluded and thus be much less motivated to engage in enriching discourse.
Accordingly, institutions would benefit from encouraging both senior
female and senior male faculty members to engage in faculty mentoring.
Another potential problem with the proposal of faculty mentoring is
that junior female faculty members who assimilate into academia in part
through mentoring may run the risk of losing some of their identity as
historical outsiders and hence be able to offer academia less outsider
perspective. This is a real concern with material consequences. However,
as noted above, junior female faculty members can choose both senior male
and senior female faculty mentors so as to get a variety of perspectives on
the workings of academia rather than just one dominant perspective. Also,
although some risk of lost identity exists, the continued harm of
discrimination against women in academia is the greater of the two evils.
If women are to be able to present their perspectives in academia, they need
to be able to advance in academia first. Hence, taking some risk is
appropriate to help remedy the existing problem.
Notwithstanding some potential problems, the benefits of faculty
mentoring become apparent. Not only will junior female faculty members
have the opportunity to gain access to the means of advancement in
academia, but when these junior faculty members grow into senior faculty
members, they will be able to assume the roles of mentors to new junior
faculty members, including women. Also, upon becoming senior faculty
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members and developing the respect of many of their peers,' women in
academia will be in better positions to speak out on the importance of
gender equality in academia and to help grant access to academia for other
qualified women. As poet Nikki Giovanni has written, "'The purpose of
any leadership is to build more leadership.""' 12 In short, this proposal for
mentoring would give junior female faculty members access to academia's
resources now, and then these women, along with willing colleagues,
would help prospective female faculty members in the future. Hence, not
only would the process of mentoring help to foster the advancement of
newer female members of academia presently, but this process, in raising
the awareness of gender-related issues, would help future female faculty
members enter academia down the road.
Another benefit of faculty mentoring, as many white men have
discovered over the years, is that when an institution grants higher status to
a particular group, enhanced salaries follow such status. Although female
presence in academia is helpful, that presence alone is not enough because
it can result in the placement of women in less favored academic positions.
However, when status accompanies presence, then salaries can begin to
rise. 13 Thus, when women are able to engage others through faculty
mentoring and, as noted below, invitational rhetoric and in turn offer
themselves as worthy of status in academia, women ultimately have a
chance to begin to earn more equitable pay for their work. Naturally,
academia's acceptance of women's worth likely will take time.
B. INVITATIONAL RHETORIC AS A MEANS OF INITIATING AND FURTHERING
FACULTY MENTORING
One approach to communication that seeks to create and maintain
relationships of "equality, immanent value, and self-determination" is
invitational rhetoric."14  Invitational rhetoric can help to initiate and
develop faculty mentoring relationships. Before addressing invitational
rhetoric and its application in academia, this portion of the article will offer
for comparative purposes a brief discussion of traditional rhetoric.
1. Traditional Rhetoric and Some of Its Limitations
Traditionally, rhetoric has involved the attempt to persuade an audience
111. Melissa Cole, Struggling to Enjoy Ourselves or Enjoying the Struggle? One
Perspective from the Newest Generation of Women Law Professors, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 321, 331 (2000) (noting the importance for junior female faculty members to have the
respect of their colleagues and suggesting that respect comes as a part of good working
relationships with one's fellow faculty members).
112. Patricia Hill Collins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1991, at 31.
113. TOBY L. PARCELL & CHARLES W. MUELLER, ASCRIPTION AND LABOR MARKETS:
RACE AND SEX DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS 280 (1983) (noting that traditionally women have
worked in jobs with less status than the jobs in which men have worked, and thus have made
less money).
114. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 5.
Summer 20041
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
to accept a given position." 5 Aristotle defined the term rhetoric as "the
faculty of discovering in every case the available means of persuasion."
116
From this perspective, a skilled rhetor1" 7 endeavors to find multiple modes
of persuasion rather than just one.' 18 Much more recently but still in the
Aristotelian vein, Michael Leff has described the term rhetoric as an
endeavor whose goal is persuasion." 9 As the above reference to Aristotle
suggests, the study of traditional rhetoric dates back to the ancient world,
specifically to fifth century B.C. Athens when the Greeks began to study
and teach rhetoric. 120 Ever since male Greek citizens of the ancient world
called upon rhetoric in the process of bringing and defending legal suits,
debating matters of public policy, and speaking on special occasions,"'
rhetoric has been important.'
22
Today, for instance, rhetoric manifests itself in legal trials and appeals
and political debates, 2 3 as well as in advertising. 124 Naturally, some such
rhetoric is more substantive than other rhetoric.1 25  Whether rhetoric is
115. For several less traditional definitions of rhetoric, which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive of the more traditional definitions, see, e.g., I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RHETORIC 3 (1965) (rhetoric as misunderstanding and its remedies); Richard M. Weaver,
Language is Sermonic, in LANGUAGE IS SERMONIC: RICHARD M. WEAVER ON THE NATURE
OF RHETORIC 201, 225 (Richard L. Johannesen et al. eds., 1970) (rhetoric as value-based);
KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 43 (Cal. Ed., 1969) (rhetoric as a symbol-using
endeavor); and SONJA K. Foss & KAREN A. FoSs, INVITING TRANSFORMATION:
PRESENTATIONAL SPEAKING FOR A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2003) (rhetoric as communication).
116. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC 5 (J.E. Sandys ed. & Richard Claverhouse Jebb trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1909) (4th Century B.C.). See also ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A
THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
117. The term rhetor can refer to a practitioner or a teacher of rhetoric. RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1155 (1991). This article defines rhetor as one who
employs rhetoric. In the context of traditional rhetoric, a synonym would be the term
advocate.
118. JAMES L. GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 28 (1997).
119. MICHAEL LEFF, The Habitation of Rhetoric, in ARGUMENT AND CRITICAL PRACTICES:
PROCEEDINGS THE FIFTH SCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 1, 6 (Joseph W.
Wenzel ed., 1987).
120. GOLDEN, ET AL., supra note 118, at 6.
121. Respectively, these three types of speaking are forensic, deliberative, and epideictic
speaking. Id. at 8.
122. Id. at 8, vii.
123. Id. at vii.
124. CHARLES U. LARSON, PERSUASION: RECEPTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5, 8 (7th ed.
1995).
125. At one point in time, the sophists, who were some of the teachers of rhetoric in
ancient Greece, had a major influence on rhetoric. GOLDEN, ET AL., supra note 118, at 7-8.
The word sophist comes from sophos, which in Greek means knowledge. Id. at 7. The term
sophist was not necessarily appropriate because the sophists often emphasized rhetoric as a
means of flattery and misleading audiences. Id. at 7-8. This sophistic interpretation of
rhetoric had a long influence on the study of rhetoric; today one might think of the term
empty rhetoric because of the sophists.
However, other thinkers have refused to adopt this view of rhetoric. For instance,
Plato, a contemporary of the sophists, focused on rhetoric as a means of disseminating truth.
Id. at 16-20. Aristotle thought of rhetoric as a way of arriving at truth. Id. at 27-28. In the
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substantive or not, in many rhetorical situations 126 rhetors seek to persuade
audiences to serve the rhetors' own ends. One can think of politicians who
want to gain or retain office, lawyers who seek to win large contingency
fees, and advertisers who want to sell a seemingly endless stream of
consumer products. Not only do such examples of traditional rhetoric often
involve justifying why a particular position is "right,"' 127 but frequently by
necessity such examples involve explaining why another position is
"'wrong."
Scholars, including many feminists, have problematized traditional
rhetoric. Some of these scholars maintain that when rhetors seek to change
the minds of audience members, rhetors implicitly, if not explicitly, can
seek to dominate audience members.128 In such circumstances, the concern
is not for the members of the audience but for achieving the rhetors' goal of
influence. Often these attempts at domination rely upon patriarchal lines of
rhetoric and can become embodied in social institutions like the law. 29
On a related note, scholars have observed that traditional rhetoric
frequently involves confrontation.130  Indeed, traditional rhetoric can be
twentieth century, Belgian philosopher Chaim Perelman argued that rhetoric is helpful in
reasoned decision-making. CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 5-8 (William
Kluback trans., 1982). Perelman's approach, which sees truth as audience-specific rather
than as absolute, rests more comfortably with a postmodem understanding of the world than
do the approaches of Plato and Aristotle. Id. at 160. Regardless, in the wake of the
sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Perelman, and other thinkers who have considered rhetoric, today
one might see some rhetors as more sophistic than others.
126. A rhetorical situation can consist of "a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or
action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence." Lloyd F. Bitzer, The
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 6 (1968). From Bitzer's perspective, before the
introduction of discourse such a situation consists of an exigence, which is "an imperfection
marked by urgency," an audience, and constraints on the situation. Id. at 6-8.
For a critique of Bitzer's modernistic understanding of a rhetorical situation, see
Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973).
According to Vatz, "[m]eaning is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or 'situations[,]' nor
are facts 'publicly observable."' Id. at 156. Instead, "meaning [is] a consequence of
rhetorical creation." Id. at 158. In light of the Vatz critique, one might understand a
rhetorical situation in more fluid terms than those of Bitzer.
127. JOSINA M. MAKAU & DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A MODEL
FOR DELIBERATIVE COMMUNITY 84 (2001).
128. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 3. Foss and Griffin acknowledge that in some
situations such control may be as minor as the control a student who tries to get a colleague
to take a particular class at university exerts. Id. However, attempts at control can be much
larger and thus potentially more harmful. Mass media advertising campaigns can be in this
vein.
129. Carrie Crenshaw, The Normality of Man and Female Otherness: (Re)Producing
Patriarchal Lines of Argument in the Law and the News, 32 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC.
170, 182-83 (1996) (generally considering discourse about Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. 187 (1991), which addressed women's equal employment opportunities in light of
fetal protection policies).
130. Catherine Helen Palczewski, Special Issue: Argumentation and Feminisms, 32
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 161, 164 (1996) (overview of rhetoric and different feminisms
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"an adversarial activity governed by war metaphors and infused with a win-
lose ideology." 131 Terms like attack, defend, and counterattack play key
roles in the discussion and practice of traditional rhetoric, and at least one
scholar has described rhetoric as "a substitute for physical force" and as
"conflict." 132  To the alarm of some scholars, the rhetoric-as-war
perspective has proven prominent, 133 especially since the "winner" of such
war-like rhetoric often feels accomplished at the expense of the "loser."'
134
On a related but brutal note, one scholar has even drawn an analogy
between very heated rhetoric and rape.
131
As one would expect, these problems with traditional rhetoric often
play out in the legal system and in politics. 136 In court, many lawyers adopt
the war metaphor and a win-lose mentality. Going towards an extreme,
some trial lawyers even attempt to mislead jurors about the nature of
evidence.137  This combative approach to discourse played out in the
impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton, and following that proceeding
many individuals no doubt questioned "how deeply committed the
participants on both sides.., were to creating an environment conducive to
reaching the most reasoned, fair, and informed decision possible."'
138
Again, the focus was on winning the rhetorical event, and the rhetors may
have desired victory at any cost.
Scholars have problematized traditional rhetoric further by noting that
traditional rhetoric is not as welcoming of personal experience and
testimony as it is of other forms of evidence like "facts, examples, expert
testimony and statistics., 139  Within the domain of traditional rhetoric,
rhetors frequently consider "facts, examples, expert testimony and
statistics" as "objective" and thus grant them a higher status than personal
to date).
131. Irwin Mallin & Karrin Vasby Anderson, Inviting Constructive Argument, 36
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 120, 121 (2000) (presenting a case for a kinder, gentler version
of traditional rhetoric).
132. David Zarefsky, Future Directions in Argumentation Theory and Practice, in
PERSPECTIVES ON ARGUMENTATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WAYNE BROCKRIEDE 288-89
(Robert Trapp & Janice Schuetz eds., 1990) (one of two perspectives given).
133. Catherine Helen Palczewski, Argument in an Off Key: Playing with the Productive
Limits of Argument, in ARGUING COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM
THE TWELFTH NCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 1, 1 (Thomas Goodnight ed.,
2002) (overall looking at rhetoric as play).
134. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 127, at 84.
135. Wayne Brockriede, Arguers As Lovers, 5 PHIL. & RHETORIC. 1, 5-8 (1972)
(presenting only the arguers as lovers metaphor).
136. Despite the traditional distinction, law and politics are not necessarily separate
endeavors. See, e.g., David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 1, 4-5 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (law as ideological).
137. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 127, at 85.
138. Id. at 85-86.
139. Barbara A. Pickering, Women's Voices As Evidence: Personal Testimony in Pro-
Choice Films, 40 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 1, 1 (2003).
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testimony and experience. 140  Although not all scholars agree about the
value of personal experience and testimony in rhetoric,' 4 1 personal
experience, which gives rise to personal testimony, can be "the
consciousness that emerges from personal participation in events" and also
one's own 'experience as [one's] truth.' ' 142 Consideration of personal
experience is important because it can lead to deeper understanding of
discursive participants and can open up the door to multiple truths. 43 In
turn, diversity often flourishes.) While individuals are able to call upon
personal experience and personal testimony in private discourse, some
scholars have noted that personal experience and testimony can play a role
in public discourse, too.145 Nonetheless, traditional rhetoric has not offered
personal experience and personal testimony a prominent place at the
rhetorical table.
Finally, as the above critiques suggest, traditional rhetoric often does
not adhere to the principles of equality, immanent value, and self-
determination, principles to which many feminists and other individuals
adhere. 46  One might think of these principles in the following way:
equality as the absence of "domination and elitism," immanent value as the
uniqueness "of all living beings," and self-determination as the right of
individuals to make their own decisions in life. 
47
2. Invitational Rhetoric as an Alternative to Traditional Rhetoric
Given the potential for domination, confrontation, and frequent lack of
recognition of personal experience and testimony that can accompany
traditional rhetoric, rhetoricians148 Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin have
theorized about what they call invitational rhetoric. "49 They define the
140. Pickering, supra note 139, at 19.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Karen A. Foss, and Sonja K. Foss, Personal Experience as Evidence in Feminist
Scholarship, 58 W. J. COMM. 39, 39 (1994) (quoting LE GuIN, DANCING AT THE EDGE OF
THE WORLD: THOUGHTS ON WORDS, WOMEN, PLACES 147-60 (1989)) [hereinafter Personal
Experience].
143. Id. at 41.
144. Id.
145. Pickering, supra note 139, at 3.
146. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 4.
147. Id.
148. The term rhetorician can refer to a teacher or a practitioner of rhetoric. RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 117, at 1155. This article defines
rhetorician as one who teaches rhetoric.
149. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 5. Despite scholarly problematization of traditional
rhetoric, Foss and Griffin do not close the door to implementation of traditional rhetoric.
Rather, by theorizing about invitational rhetoric they seek "to expand the array of
communicative options available to all rhetors," which concedes that sometimes traditional
"persuasion is often necessary." Id. Hopefully, rhetors who may need to call upon
traditional rhetoric in certain situations will endeavor to employ a less war-like and more
humane version of traditional rhetoric that avoids controlling, dominating, and
confrontational behavior.
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term as "an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship
rooted in equality, immanent value, and self-determination."' 50 Invitational
rhetoric offers the audience of the rhetoric a chance "to enter the rhetor's
world and to see it as the rhetor does."' 51  When communicating, the
invitational rhetor refrains from judging the perspectives of audience
members, and the audience members attempt to refrain from judging the
perspective rhetor.152  Rather than seeking to change the audience, the
rhetor seeks to help the audience understand the rhetor's perspective;
understanding is the key.153 The process is about offering perspectives and
not about telling others to take a given action or understand that their ideas
are flawed. 54 Any change in perspective takes place when members of the
audience choose to make such change.
1 55
Although invitational rhetoric will not succeed in all cases in which
rhetors employ it, when invitational rhetoric is to succeed, it tends to
consist of at least three external conditions: safety, value, and freedom.
56
On a related note, while this article presents invitational rhetoric in contrast to
traditional rhetoric, this article in no way means to imply that invitational rhetoric and
traditional rhetoric always must be binary opposites. Instead, it may be more helpful to
think of a given discourse as situated on a continuum that ranges from invitational rhetoric
to traditional rhetoric. This given discourse may be closer to traditional rhetoric or to
invitational rhetoric.
For a discursive approach that in some circumstances like group or interpersonal
communication can be quite similar to invitational rhetoric, see NANCY M. DIXON,
PERSPECTIVES ON DIALOGUE: MAKING TALK DEVELOPMENTAL FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 24-32 (1996). Dixon defines dialogue as "talk... that affirms the person-
to-person relationship between discussants and which acknowledges their collective right
and intellectual capacity to make sense of the world." Id. at 24. She adds that dialogue
affirms the positions of discussants but that it can lead to the examination of one's own
positions and the positions of others. Id. at 24-25. Although dialogue can lead to
examination of discussants' positions, dialogue is not judgmental. Id. at 28. Also, dialogue
acknowledges the value of people and avoids their utility. Id. at 29.
150. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 5.
151. LId.
152. Id. In invitational rhetoric, the rhetor and the audience will have a chance to
exchange roles so that both parties have the opportunity to speak as well as to listen.
153. Id.
154. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 7-10; Mallin & Anderson, supra note 131, at 130.
Invitational rhetoric may not directly be well-suited for public debates such as those in the
legislative and judicial branches of government, which call for reasonably prompt
resolution. However, invitational rhetoric can play a positive role behind the scenes in such
debates. For instance, in private two legislators might call upon invitational rhetoric to
understand each other's perspective better and then rely upon this understanding to work out
an effective compromise on a piece of legislation. Likewise, two trial lawyers in private
could call upon invitational rhetoric to understand each other's perspective better and then
rely upon that understanding to work out a settlement.
155. Foss & Foss, supra note 115, at 13-14.
156. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 10. Foss and Griffin point out that a rhetor can offer
a perspective regardless of whether "an audience chooses to join with a rhetor in a process
of discovery and understanding." Id. However, the experience will not be as rich as it
might have been if the audience had chosen to join the rhetor in that process. Id. Naturally,
some experiences with invitational rhetoric will be more enriching than others.
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Foss and Griffin define these conditions in the following manner: safety as
"the creation of a feeling of security and [absence of] danger for the
audience," value as "the acknowledgment that audience members have
intrinsic or immanent worth," and freedom as "the power to choose or
decide."1 57 To the work of Foss and Griffin, Foss and colleague Karen
Foss have added openness as a fourth condition that helps to foster
invitational rhetoric; they define openness as "seek[ing] out and
consider[ing] as many perspectives as possible."'' 58
To help foster the conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness
that can lead to invitational rhetoric, Foss and Foss suggest the process of
re-sourcement, which is finding a new source of "energy and
inspiration."' 1'9  Re-sourcement involves disengaging oneself from an
interaction frame of conquest or conversion of one's audience and then
engaging that audience from a non-conquest and non-conversion
interaction frame. 
160
To illustrate their theory of invitational rhetoric, Foss and Griffin have
offered several examples of instances of successful invitational rhetoric.
One such example involves two individuals with drastically opposing
perspectives on abortion. Encountering each other at an airport in New
York, a woman who favored abortion, and a man who opposed abortion,
began to scream at each other until they almost required separation. One
hour later, as the woman boarded a bus, she discovered that the only
available seat was next to the man with whom she had just had the verbal
altercation. 62 Instead of resuming the same type of discourse, the woman
began to ask the man about his life, and the man responded in kind.1
63
While neither had changed her or his perspective, over the course of the
discussion each developed a deeper understanding of and appreciation for
the other.164 In a case where traditional rhetoric had proved destructive,
invitational rhetoric had succeeded in fostering the external conditions of
safety, value, freedom, 65 and openness. Each speaker promoted safety by
respecting a differing perspective on a highly charged issue; each speaker
promoted value by legitimizing, although not adopting, a different point of
view; each speaker promoted freedom by allowing the other to continue to
feel as she or he chose to feel with regard to this subject; 166 and each
157. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 10-12.
158. Foss & Foss, supra note 115, at 39.
159. Foss & Foss, supra note 115, at 44.
160. Id. at44-48.
161. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 14.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15. The woman summarized her experience by stating, "'It's a way to disagree
and at the same time not to hurt each other and to respect each other and to have, actually,
something very close and tender."' Id.
165. Id.
166. Consistent with their interest in refraining from intentionally trying to change the
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speaker promoted openness by looking at another perspective.
A different example of successful invitational rhetoric that Foss and
Griffin have offered involves the manner in which poets Adrienne Rich,
Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde handled acceptance of the 1974 National
Book Award. Although all three women had received nominations for the
award, only Rich received the actual award.167 However, in accepting this
award, Rich did so on behalf of herself, Walker, and Lorde, noting, "'We,
Audre Lorde, Adrienne Rich, and Alice Walker, together accept this award
in the name of all the women whose voices have gone and still go unheard
in a patriarchal world.'''168  In expressing their own perspective in this
manner, the poets fostered the external conditions of safety, value,
freedom, and openness. The poets promoted safety by recognizing as
legitimate the one-winner approach of the judges of the National Book
Awards; 69 the poets promoted the value of the members of the extended
audience, especially women, by noting the personal sacrifices of many
audience members;1 70 the poets promoted freedom by allowing the
audience to choose its own course of action in response to the speech; 
71
and the poets promoted openness by placing their perspective in a
communication context of differing perspectives on the issue at hand.
Despite Foss and Griffin's enthusiasm, invitational rhetoric comes with
some limitations of its own.' 7 2  For example, willingness to engage in
minds of their readers, Foss and Griffin employ the tentative word suggest to explain their
understanding of this incident. These two scholars do not maintain that their understanding
of this incident is the only one possible, and they likely would entertain other
understandings. Id.
167. Foss and Griffin, supra note 14, at 15.
168. Id. Rich added, "'None of us could accept this money for herself."' She also noted,
"'We will share this prize among us, to be used as best we can for women."' Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 13-14. Rich specifically stated the following:
We dedicate this occasion to the struggle for self-determination of all
women, of every color, identification, or derived class: the poet, the
housewife, the lesbian, the mathematician, the mother, the dishwasher, the
pregnant teenager, the teacher, the grandmother, the prostitute, the
philosopher, the waitress, the women who will understand what we are
doing here and those who will not understand yet.
Id. at 13.
171. Id. at 14.
172. For scholarship that critiques invitational rhetoric, see, e.g., M. Lane Bruner,
Producing Identities: Gender Problematization and Feminist Argumentation, 32
ARGUMENTATION & ADvoc. 185, 187-88 (1996) (maintaining that invitational rhetoric
reifies traditional gender stereotypes and is self-contradictory) and Richard Fulkerson,
Transcending Our Conception of Argument in Light of Feminist Critiques, 32
ARGUMENTATION & ADvoc. 199, 204-06 (1996) (maintaining that invitational rhetoric
labels persuasion as always wrong, opens the door wide to moral relativism, and is too
conservative at enacting change). For scholarship that responds to some of these critiques,
see, e.g., Mallin & Anderson, supra note 131, at 121-24.
To respond to critiques of invitational rhetoric, one might make several points. In
terms of Bruner's critiques, invitational rhetoric is more fluid than he acknowledges it to be.
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invitational rhetoric is indeed a prerequisite for the success of invitational
rhetoric. When parties will not engage each other in an invitational
manner, they cannot come to understand each other. Also, parties who
attempt to engage in invitational rhetoric may end up hurting one another
through heated discourse that can result from the parties' failing to listen
carefully to and refrain from judging one another. Thus, invitational
rhetoric comes with some risks.
These limitations noted, invitational rhetoric can be beneficial for
several reasons. For instance, invitational rhetoric is particularly well-
suited for fostering "cooperative, nonadversarial, and ethical
communication" since invitational rhetoric accepts multiple perspectives as
valid. 173 Because it does accept multiple perspectives as valid, invitational
rhetoric can validate the personal experiences and testimonies of any
individuals regardless of how privileged or nonprivileged such individuals
happen to be. Also, invitational rhetoric gives women and other outsiders,
along with other empathetic insiders, an approach to call upon in
attempting "to transform systems of domination and oppression.' ' 174 While
invitational rhetoric does not attempt to make specific change, change is a
potential outcome of invitational rhetoric since this type of rhetoric allows
rhetors "to disengage from the dominance and mastery so common to a
system of oppression."'' 75 Indeed, when the parties are willing to engage
each other and can avoid heated discourse, invitational rhetoric can help the
parties to push the limits of imagination and open doors to new
Apparently anticipating Bruner's critique, Foss and Griffin have stated:
We also do not want to suggest that the rhetoric we propose describes how
all women communicate or that it is or can be used only by women ....
The rhetoric we describe is a rhetoric used at various times by some women
and some men, some feminists and some non-feminists.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 5. Also, while invitational rhetors may desire that their
audiences accept given positions, invitational rhetors still have the option of focusing on
encouraging audiences to understand the rhetors' perspectives and on trying to understand
audiences' perspectives. In short, rhetors have the choice to communicate invitationally.
In terms of Fulkerson's critiques, Foss and Griffin themselves admit that traditional
"persuasion is often necessary." Id. However, hopefully such traditional rhetoric will take
place in a more humane manner than it often does. Additionally, validating the perspectives
of others as human perspectives does not preclude rhetors from later attempting to change
the circumstances that produce morally suspect positions. Foss & Foss, supra note 115, at
18-19. Finally, with regard to change, invitational rhetoric can be as conservative or liberal
as the participating rhetors desire it to be. If the rhetors agree to act after having engaged in
invitational rhetoric, then they are free to do so. However, they do not have to choose to act.
173. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 15.
174. Id. at 16. Foss and Foss suggest that invitational rhetoric can help a rhetor understand
the positions of individuals, such as neo-Nazis, whose perspectives are hateful. Foss &
Foss, supra note 115, at 18-19. For example, such individuals may have had difficult life
experiences and blamed certain groups for those experiences. Id. With a better
understanding of such positions, the rhetor then can go about attempting to change the
conditions that foster such hateful perspectives. Id.
175. Foss & Griffin, supra note 14, at 17.
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possibilities.176
3. Invitational Rhetoric in Academia
Given the potential benefits of invitational rhetoric, junior female
faculty members and empathetic established members of academia,
whether female or male, would do well to employ invitational rhetoric in
approaching and furthering mentoring relationships. In order to foster
understanding, younger faculty women could benefit from the opportunity
to explain their perspectives and life experiences to both members of the
main insider group, white men, and to other members of outsider groups,
such as older women, who are already in academia. Likewise, members of
the dominant insider group could benefit from the opportunity to explain
their perspectives and life experiences to members of outsider groups,
including younger faculty women. Rarely can individuals with frequently
different experiences come to understand each other until they make time
to talk and, perhaps more importantly, to listen.
A tension exists between the implementation of invitational rhetoric,
which is based on the assumption of equality, and faculty mentoring, which
to a certain extent is based on an assumption of hierarchy or differing levels
of expertise, but this tension is manageable. While equality may be an
ideal, the real177 is an academic world of hierarchy, and faculty mentoring
is a valuable means of helping new faculty members, including women,
navigate that world of hierarchy. Hence, invitational rhetoric and faculty
mentoring can function together in negotiating the line between an ideal of
176. Another benefit of invitational rhetoric is that this genre of rhetoric can have a
medicinal effect on the practice of traditional rhetoric. As Foss and Griffin observe, some
situations do call for traditional rhetoric. Foss and Griffin supra note 14, at 5. However, the
practice of traditional rhetoric does not always have to be devoid of ethical concerns.
Rhetors who understand that traditional rhetoric leaves open the door to domination,
confrontation, and other problems may be well aware of the need to avoid such problems.
Indeed, while rhetors might choose to employ traditional rhetoric to work directly towards
decision-making, they can employ some of the qualities of invitational rhetoric at the same
time.
For example, instead of seeing traditional rhetoric as a way to "win," rhetors who
employ traditional rhetoric may consider it as a means of working to solve problems.
Fulkerson, supra note 172, at 200. Although traditional rhetoric calls for a decision, the
parties still can respect each other's contributions to the rhetorical process. Id. Hence, a
more humane version of traditional rhetoric influenced by invitational rhetoric can involve
participants' seeing each other as resources rather than rivals. MAKAU & MARTY, supra
note 127, at 88. Along the same lines, rhetors who engage in a more humane version of
traditional rhetoric have the chance to understand better the interests of others, and such an
understanding can play a part in explicit decision-making. Mallin & Anderson supra note
131, at 127.
177. Here the term real refers to an understanding of the world from the perspective of
those individuals who view academia as an institution of hierarchy, particularly with regard
to gender. This understanding is the real for such individuals. However, other individuals
with different perspectives on academia might employ the same term to refer to another
view of academia and thus a different real.
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equality and the real until equality can flourish more fully. Meanwhile,
invitational rhetoric can work as a means of opening minds to alternatives
to hierarchy.
As suggested above, some members of both insider and outsider groups
may not feel comfortable engaging in invitational rhetoric with each other.
Naturally, academia would not want to force such discourse. In such cases
of potential discomfort, new female faculty members would be able to
benefit from the variety of potential mentors available. A new female
faculty member could enter a mentoring situation with a senior female
faculty mentor. When, in part through the help of her senior female faculty
mentor, the junior female faculty mentor becomes more established in
academia over the course of a few years, she may feel more comfortable
entering into additional and different mentoring relationships. Then a
senior male faculty mentor could be a possibility as an additional mentor
and a participant in invitational rhetoric. Hence, just as the senior female
faculty mentor has had something of value to offer the junior female
faculty member, so might the senior male faculty mentor have something
of value to offer, but the offering would be at a time of the junior faculty
member's choosing. Ideally, the junior faculty member would have her
own valuable experiences and perspectives to share with each of her
mentors.
Alternatively, invitational rhetoric within a group mentoring context is
another possibility. The junior female faculty member might seek group
mentoring from the senior female and senior male faculty members
together. Also, the junior female faculty member and several other junior
female faculty members could seek group mentoring from either or both of
the senior faculty members noted above. As these illustrations
demonstrate, the process of invitational rhetoric can unfold in different
ways.
With a stated desire to express and also to listen, over time many junior
female academics will be able to connect more effectively with established
members of academia, ultimately including some key older white men.
While adopting another person's perspective is not necessarily required,
through discourse understanding becomes possible, and understanding is an
initial step towards acceptance and potential change.1 78  Through
invitational rhetoric, even subtle discrimination that Title VII has never
been able to address can come to the surface.
For instance, a senior male faculty member who grew up in a long-
gone era and who is presently an expert on the oratory of that era's
president might never have thought consciously about why he doubts that a
178. Naturally, invitational rhetoric will not lead to understanding in all circumstances.
Some members of the insider audience may refuse to participate in this form of discourse.
However, everyone's participation is not necessary for material improvements to take place
overall.
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much younger scholar, particularly a woman, who did not live in that era
could study credibly the rhetoric of the long-gone era's president.
Invitational rhetoric may raise the senior scholar's awareness of such a bias
and offer him the chance to explain why he sees the world in that way and
also to ask of his junior colleague why she sees the world differently.
When exchanges of this nature happen, individuals more aware of their
mind-sets and can become more open to different ways of perceiving
academia. Indeed, some relatively open-minded insiders who may have
subtly discriminatory biases can begin to see as collaborators in addressing
the common issue of how to mold the future of U.S. academia.
79
Likewise, junior female academics can begin to see what they might learn
from more senior members.
This type of understanding can lead to rich mentoring relationships,
and in that communication context, access to doors within academia can
develop for junior female faculty members. As junior female faculty
members begin to rise in status and academia becomes more deeply aware
of issues related to gender-based discrimination, the previously junior
female faculty members who will have become more senior faculty
members, along with other willing members, will be able to open the doors
of academia to future generations of new female faculty members. As
suggested above, advancing women will be able to help younger women
enter academia and then make progress within it.
Because, as many white men likely have noticed over the years, the
status quo rewards those individuals it values, when the doors of academia
open up and academia begins to grant women a more equitable status, the
existing power structure inevitably will face the issue of remedying salary
inequities. As noted above, the presence of women in academia alone is
insufficient to bring about change. Rather, status is necessary because with
status comes greater pay.' 80 In this case, status can come from an
understanding of merit that stems in part from mentoring and invitational
rhetoric. Thus, enhanced salaries ultimately can accompany the enhanced
status of women in academia.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article has laid out, women as a group continue to have second-
class status in U.S. academia. Research data show that since the early
1970s the presence of women in academia has not improved satisfactorily
and that women's salaries have not improved at all. Hence, although Title
VII has altered the legal policy on gender-based discrimination, Title VII
has not resolved many of the gender-based problems in academia.
179. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 131, at 127 (speaking generally about constructive
argument).
180. PARCEL & MUELLER, supra note 113, at 280.
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Nevertheless, academia, which is not by nature "masculine,"' 8' does
not always have to look and feel as it does today because additional
approaches can supplement Title VII. Specifically, faculty mentoring
brought about and developed through invitational rhetoric is one such
additional approach. Like any process that attempts to foster understanding
and has the potential for change, an approach that embraces faculty
mentoring and invitational rhetoric undoubtedly will take time. Also, since
gender-based discrimination, unintended or not, is a deeply ingrained social
ailment, this article makes no claim that its suggested approach is the one
all-encompassing solution to gender-based discrimination in academia.
However, this article does suggest that faculty mentoring and invitational
rhetoric can help women begin to advance further in academia. When
women do so, a more equitable image will start to appear in academia's
looking glass, and academia will become richer with perspectives and
insights. Consequently, women such as Lani Guinier and others who want
to get somewhere in academia will not need to run twice as fast as men to
arrive at the desired destination, and U.S. society will be a slightly better
place because of that situation.
181. Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 358 (1996) (specifically addressing the law and law school).
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